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Since the turn of the new century, urban 
mega-projects became a new growth 
strategy in Morocco. Yet, in contrast to 
their utopian promises, urban mega-proj-
ects do not solve the contemporary urban 
crisis in the region, but reproduce it in dif-
ferent ways. A paradigmatic case is the 
Bouregreg project in the valley between 
Rabat and Salé. This article considers the 
ways in which this megaproject repre-
sents a means to extract profits and priva-
tize public wealth, but also how it repre-
sents an urban laboratory for the 
development of new modalities of gov-
ernment, control, and domination. Finally 
it assesses the social impact of the project 
on small-scale farmers and private land-
owners. 
Keywords: Morocco, urban government, 
neoliberalism, new state spaces
Battles are fought against the enc-
roachments of a central authority and 
state pressure. But we know that the 
real problems lie elsewhere, that the 
most important decisions are made el-
sewhere. (Lefebvre 183)
From the terrace of Café Maure in the cas-
bah of the Oudayas, one can enjoy the 
panoramic view of the Bouregreg Valley 
(figure 1). The 12th-century citadel is built 
on the rocky shore where the Bouregreg 
River flows out into the Atlantic Ocean 
between the Moroccan capital Rabat and 
its neighboring city, Salé. Especially on 
summer evenings, the riverbanks look full 
of life. Jet-skiers are taking off, men are 
fishing, families are strolling along the 
quay, teenagers are diving in the water, 
and ferrymen take you across the river 
from one shore to the other. 
The valley is surrounded by the remains of 
Morocco’s rich past: the casbah, the 
Hassan Tower, the Mohamed V mauso-
leum, the medinas of Salé and Rabat, and 
further into the valley, the Chellah, a forti-
fied medieval necropolis. Each one of 
these sites has become an important tour-
ist attraction. Yet, the estuary attracts not 
only tourists, but also real estate investors. 
A whole new urban center is arising on the 
shore of Salé right across the casbah, with 
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1,700 new residential units, a new marina, 
luxury hotels, retail facilities, bars, and res-
taurants. La Marina Morocco, as its Abu 
Dhabi developer Eagle Hills calls it, has 
become a new luxury hub for living, lei-
sure, and entertainment. But that’s not all. 
A new bridge (Pont Moulay Hassan) now 
connects the two riverbanks. Together 
with two tramlines, a tunnel underneath 
the casbah, and a brand-new belt highway 
further along the valley, these state-of-the-
art infrastructures improve mobility 
between two cities plagued by traffic con-
gestion. 
The most remarkable feature of the val-
ley’s transformation so far is situated right 
behind the bridge. The ongoing construc-
tion of the Grand Theatre, designed by the 
late “starchitect” Zaha Hadid, will become 
Rabat’s newest landmark. The fluid sculp-
ture form of the theater, inspired by the 
movement of the river itself, symbolizes 
the capital’s own aspiration for a 
“Guggenheim effect” (Rodríguez et al). It 
is the cornerstone of an urban renaissance 
that aims to turn a dull administrative city 
into a top-notch cultural destination – for 
now, at least. Only a few hundred meters 
from the construction site of the theater, 
billboards already announce another 
landmark endeavor: The Mohamed VI 
Tower, a 55-storey skyscraper. The deal to 
build Africa’s tallest tower, which was 
announced in the summer of 2017, is a 
multimillion dollar partnership between 
the Moroccan real estate company Travaux 
Généraux de Construction de Casablanca 
(TGCC), headed by Othman Benjelloun, 
one of Morocco’s most influential entre-
preneurs, and China Railway Construction 
Corporation (CRCC).  
These future material icons of showcase 
urbanization are part of a long-term proj-
ect that stretches fifteen kilometers inland 
along the Bouregreg River up to the bar-
rage Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah. 
Launched in January 2006, the Bouregreg 
project encompasses a territory of six 
thousand hectares and will be developed 
in six different phases (figure 2). The first 
two phases are currently underway.
The developments in Bouregreg Valley 
are a salient example of a broader process 
of economic and political transformation 
that embodies the reign of King 
Mohammed VI ever since his accession to 
the throne in 1999. Under his impetus, the 
launch of urban megaprojects and large-
scale infrastructural works came to charac-
terize a new development strategy, an 
“urbanism of projects” (Cattedra) or a 
“new culture of projects” (Barthel and 
Zaki), trying to link networks of investment 
capital in Europe, Africa, and the Middle 
East and if possible Asia and the United 
States. This new development strategy 
Figure 1: View on Bouregreg
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should also be situated within larger 
entrepreneurial shifts in which megaproj-
ects become the cornerstones of the cur-
rent spatial re-organization of globaliza-
tion (Brenner and Theodore; Harvey; 
Massey). Mega-projects are considered 
key for the commercial redevelopment of 
urban centers and the promotion of the 
city’s “unique selling position”, both in the 
Global North (Flyvbjerg) and the Global 
South (Ren and Weinstein), and more spe-
cifically the Arab region (Wippel et al.). 
What matters here are not just the material 
changes in the urban landscape, but also 
how these projects reveal new political 
practices and agency that materialize in 
the interplay between global capitalism 
and local places such as Rabat and Salé. 
Cities like Rabat, but also Casablanca and 
Tangiers, became the privileged vehicles 
of economic regeneration and capital 
accumulation, as well as testing grounds 
for the re-invention of (authoritarian) poli-
tics and urban government (Bogaert). In 
other words, the transformation of the 
Moroccan city tells a broader story about 
the transformation of politics, the state, 
and the economy within a context of glo-
balization and neoliberal reform. 
In this article, we question some of the 
promises and logics behind Morocco’s 
urbanism of projects. One the one hand, 
they can be a site for the production of 
new political imaginaries, future aspira-
tions, and expectations of social justice 
(Strava). But more often, they produce new 
forms of social exclusion and feelings of 
marginalization. Our examination first ana-
lyzes the new institutional and govern-
mental arrangements that emerged within 
the context of the Bouregreg project. 
Second, we want to draw attention to the 
expectations and concerns of some of the 
people who live in the valley and reflect on 
their relations with the project. 
Figure 2: The Bouregreg Project
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This article is based on joint ethnographic 
fieldwork and expert interviews with offi-
cials and other stakeholders conducted in 
April and July 2018. It also draws on find-
ings from earlier fieldwork between 2007-
2013 (Koenraad) and 2014 and 2018 
(Maryame).
New state spaces and ad hoc urbanism in 
the Moroccan capital
To realize the Bouregreg mega-project, 
the Moroccan authorities created a new 
institutional model of state power: the 
Agency for the Development of the 
Bouregreg Valley. Law 16-04, which cre-
ated the agency in November 2005, gives 
the agency exclusive authority over the 
project within its legally defined territorial 
boundaries (the six thousand hectares). 
Within that territory, local governmental 
entities such as the prefectures, the local 
municipalities, and the Rabat-Salé Urban 
Planning Agency are effectively sidelined. 
The Bouregreg Agency is authorized to 
develop zoning plans, organize public 
inquiries, provide public infrastructure, 
allocate land for construction, deliver con-
struction permits, regulate all deeds of 
sale, and expropriate private land 
deemed necessary for the advancement 
of the project. All state-owned land was 
transferred to the agency free of charge. 
The agency functions as a quasi-state 
within a state. 
This particular form of neoliberal statecraft 
is a salient example of what Neil Brenner 
has termed “new state spaces” (Brenner). 
It implies not just a rescaling of state 
power (i.e., from the national to the urban 
scale), but also a whole new assemblage 
of power by which foreign actors are inte-
grated in the decision-making process. 
The Bouregreg Agency operates as an 
intermediary between various investors 
from around the world and the Moroccan 
context. It not only attracts investors such 
as the Abu Dhabi investor Eagle Hills (first 
phase) and the sovereign wealth fund 
Wessal Capital1 (second phase), it also 
gives them decision-making power. As a 
semi-public entity, the Bouregreg Agency 
is allowed by Law 16-04 to set up private 
enterprises and create joint ventures with 
private investors. Not surprisingly, plans, 
goals, and strategies are adapted regu-
larly within the institutional and legal 
framework of the project in order to better 
serve the interests of foreign investors. 
Three examples can be given. First, before 
the official launch of the project, a Royal 
Commission assembling all kinds of 
experts and policy-makers drafted a 165-
page plan that can still be consulted on 
the official website of the Bouregreg proj-
ect. Especially the first phase, now La 
Marina Morocco, was worked out in detail 
and the Commission anticipated the con-
struction of a central, open, and green 
public space in front of the medina of 
Salé, where inhabitants of both cities 
could come together, stroll, and picnic. It 
was important, the commission stated, 
that the new public place would be 
“planned with less density than the shore 
of Rabat to allow a larger variety of uses 
by the population of the city” (Royaume 
du Maroc 40). Eventually, as an official of 
the Bouregreg Agency admitted, the 
whole plan was revised and the building 
site was densified to increase the profit-
ability of the private investor.2 Where they 
once planned a public park, there is now 
a gated community. 
Another example can be given with regard 
to the second phase. Originally, this phase 
was going to be developed by Sama 
Dubai, before it defaulted in 2008 due to 
the financial crisis. Sama Dubai had 
planned a luxurious residential islet that 
was dubbed Amwaj (the waves) and sub-
divided – Venetian style – into smaller 
waterways. Residents would be able to 
reach their villas by boat. The Amwaj proj-
ect was eventually replaced by the Grand 
Theatre, financed by public money, while 
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a new investment fund was contracted 
(Wessal Capital) to urbanize the zone 
around it. What is striking, however, is that 
several officials of the Agency confirmed 
to us that the partnership with Sama Dubai 
was a mistake from the very beginning. 
The all seemed to agree that Morocco did 
not need megalomaniac Dubai-style resi-
dential projects like The World or Palm 
Jumeirah. Some of these officials were 
relieved that it had failed. When we then 
asked one of them why the agency had 
accepted the deal with Sama Dubai in the 
first place, despite the seemingly general 
consensus that it was a bad idea, he 
answered, “Well, what do you do when 
somebody comes with a check for two bil-
lion dirhams.”3
A final example relates to the later phases, 
which are still in their conceptual phase. 
Again, according to officials from the 
Agency, several factors (i.e., considerable 
delays in the first two phases, the satura-
tion of the real estate market, and the 
opposition of small landowners) played a 
role in the decision – for now – to plan the 
urbanization of these phases for the long 
term, in partnership with local inhabitants 
and with less density than originally 
planned. Nevertheless, a lot can change in 
the future, as an official stated: 
In ten years we can always revise 
the urban development plan (plan 
d’aménagement). For example, be-
cause of the demographic pressure. 
For now, it’s the current plan that works 
for us. But you never know whether 
there will be new opportunities. It’s the 
market actually that dictates the plan-
ning.4
Urban planning and government are thus 
subject to fluctuations in the market and 
become more accountable to investors 
than to the citizens who actually live in the 
zones under development. Even if local 
governments in a country such as Morocco 
were to become more democratically 
accountable, democracy itself has been 
short-circuited by institutional arrange-
ments like the Bouregreg Agency. 
Authority in the Bouregreg Valley is thus 
the result of a particular relational configu-
ration between local, regional, and inter-
national actors (Allen). This does not mean 
that power and authority are slipping away 
from the traditional power center in 
Morocco (the regime, the monarchy), only 
that central state power has been recon-
figured and reassembled so that it is now 
entangled, negotiated, and shared with 
other forces (e.g. Gulf capital) to pursue 
common interests within a rapidly chang-
ing global context.   
As a result, urban planning in the valley 
seems to evolve quite ad hoc, answering 
to specific – but also contingent – market 
problems and solutions. In an interview 
with an official of the Urban Agency of 
Rabat-Salé, which is responsible for the 
coordination of urban planning in the 
whole metropolitan area, he lamented, 
“The Wilaya (the governorate) does its 
best to assure a coherent vision (on urban 
planning), but how do we reconcile this 
with the Bouregreg Agency, which seems 
to escape from everything. It’s really 
another country”5. 
The Bouregreg Agency is not an excep-
tion. For each specific development prob-
lem there seems to be the need to create 
a specific governmental entity or new 
state space. Over the past two decades, 
we have seen the establishment of several 
similar state agencies within the domains 
of urban planning, industrialization, tour-
ism, etc.. Some examples are the Marchica 
Med Agency in Nador, Casablanca 
Finance City Authority, and Tanger Med 
Special Authority. There seems to be a 
general strategy to take all large develop-
ment projects and government dossiers 
out of the hands of conventional and 
elected state government institutions in 
favor of an “agencification” of public pol-
icy (García and Collado) and the increas-
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ing dominance of “technocratic struc-
tures” loyal to the palace (Hibou and Tozy). 
This has been a trend not only in Morocco, 
but also in many different urban develop-
ment settings all around the world (Ong). 
Moreover, urban mega-projects, such as 
in the Bouregreg Valley, also symbolize a 
fundamental shift in Moroccan authori-
tarianism. Whereas Hassan II ruled with an 
iron hand during the Years of Lead (les 
années de plomb), Mohammed VI seems 
to rule via holdings, funds, and specialized 
state agencies (Bogaert).
Stuck between different “times”: life in a 
valley under construction 
The following analysis of our field notes 
does not strive to be exhaustive, only to 
point out some aspects of the social 
impact of the project that are not obvious 
at first glance. While others have focused 
on those populations that were directly 
affected by La Marina Morocco, the first 
and most advanced phase of the 
Bouregreg project (Mouloudi), we want to 
draw attention to those people living in 
areas that are not yet under development. 
More specifically, we focused on the small 
farmers, gardeners, and other inhabitants 
of Oulja, a large agricultural plain and wet-
land integrated in phase three of the proj-
ect, and the people of Sidi Hmida in the 
district of Hssain in phase five. Our goal is 
not to map the conditions of the entire 
population affected by the project, only to 
reframe the agency’s own promoted val-
ues of citizenship (citoyenneté) and sus-
tainable city planning.
It’s important to know that between the 
launch of the project in 2005 and the pub-
lication in 2009 of the Plan d’Aménagement 
Spécial (PAS), a complete zoning plan for 
the valley, the Bouregreg Agency sus-
pended all private (land) transactions 
except those done by the agency itself. 
After the publication of the PAS, no land 
can be sold or bought without the permis-
sion of the agency. Legally, the agency 
also has the authority to expropriate any 
private land within its designated zone at 
a fixed price determined by the value of 
the land in 2005. This creates a particular 
situation. Those who still own private land 
in the valley cannot really bring that land 
into the market. Land prices are de facto 
locked by the Bouregreg Agency. 
The agency explains this as follows: as a 
financially autonomous semi-public entity, 
the agency’s business model depends on 
revenue generated in the first phase to 
finance the second phase, and so on. In 
other words, the Bouregreg Agency 
depends on the surplus value created on 
public land and/or expropriated land in 
one phase in order to advance to the next 
phase. This revenue model is by its very 
character a gradual process. One cannot 
market all available land at once, because 
that would create oversupply and possibly 
a rapid fall in land prices. 
From the point of view of the inhabitants 
who live in those areas still “under devel-
opment”, this produces an uncomfortable 
standstill. While the direct impact of the 
megaproject is clear-cut and visible for 
those people who live in the surroundings 
of La Marina Morocco (e.g. through expro-
priation, gentrification, the privatization of 
public space, etc.), it is much less so for 
those who live deeper in the valley. This 
doesn’t mean, however, that they are less 
affected. All they seem to be able to do is 
wait for the project to arrive. In the mean-
time, they cannot really get on with their 
lives. Most of them don’t know what will be 
in store for them. Many people we talked 
to, especially in Oulja, told us that they 
were left completely in limbo.  
During one of our visits to Oulja, we met 
with the owner of a small tree nursery. He 
took over the business from his parents 
and had lived in the valley all his life. But 
since the launch of the project, he doesn’t 
really know what the future will bring. Will 
he be able to stay? Will his tree nursery 
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #12–2019
FOCUS 50
have a place in the project? Or will he have 
to leave? 
I cannot even plant extra trees to ex-
pand my business, because the agen-
cy wouldn’t allow it and I wouldn’t be 
compensated for the extra trees if the 
moment comes that they expropriate 
me. 
The price he would get for his land was 
fixed at 250 Moroccan dirhams per square 
meter, less than 25 euros. 
With that kind of money you cannot 
find something suitable in the city. Be-
sides, I don’t want to live in the city. I 
want to keep my tree nursery. But whe-
re else will I find a plot of land this close 
to the city and this fertile? Not for the 
price we’ll get. There are no other lands 
in the proximity of Rabat where you can 
dig up water at five or six meters.6 
But not everybody living in this area is a 
private landowner. We also met with a 
family of peasants who cultivated Habous 
land in the valley.7 They have already been 
there for several generations. The head of 
the family had worked the land all his life 
and now he shared it with his seven sons 
and their families. “This is Ard Jdidna (land 
of our grandparents) and we don’t want to 
leave this place”.8 However, all Habous 
land was taken over by the Bouregreg 
Agency, and the family did not know what 
was going to happen to them once their 
land would be subject to development. 
They told us that the Ministry of Habous 
even stopped accepting the families’ rent 
for the usufruct of the land. Their fate was 
now in the hands of the agency, they felt. 
Power inequality and social hierarchy can 
be understood here through the different 
use and experience of time. The Bouregreg 
Agency has time. Time that many of the 
inhabitants of the valley do not have. Thus, 
the agency and the inhabitants of the val-
ley are operating in different time frames, 
with one side dictating a particular time 
schedule conforming to its own interests, 
while the other side tries to cope with that 
schedule’s effects of uncertainty and dis-
torted temporality. It’s logical that a mega-
project of the magnitude of the one in the 
Bouregreg Valley unfolds over a timespan 
of several years and even decades. 
Moreover, given its revenue model, it is 
obliged to take the time necessary to 
anticipate (better) market opportunities 
and developments. In the meantime, the 
inhabitants might be – quite literally – stuck 
there for another five years, maybe ten, 
who knows, even fifteen before the proj-
ect reaches their spot. 
People like the owner of the tree nursery 
or the small peasant family feel that they 
cannot go somewhere else, but at the 
same time, they also feel they cannot really 
build a life in the valley, either. On every 
issue, for example building permits, reno-
vation permits, electrification, access to 
water or sewerage, they have to deal with 
the Agency. Actually, many inhabitants in 
the area lack access to drinking water and 
have no connection to the sewage system. 
But given their “temporary status” within 
the timeframe of the project, the agency 
does not seem to be willing to provide 
these people with what they need. Many 
inhabitants feel powerless. 
When we address the caid or the mqad-
dem (the local authorities),9 they all say 
that we have to talk to the agency,” another 
of our interlocutors told us. Many feel that 
there is not much they can do. “Fighting 
against the agency is like fighting the 
ocean. You cannot stop it.10 
Not everybody in the valley, however, 
resigns himself to the omnipotence of the 
Bouregreg Agency. In Rabat and espe-
cially Salé, associations such as Sala Al 
Mustaqbal, Ribat Al Fath, and Association 
Bouregreg have tried to negotiate with or 
put pressure on the Bouregreg Agency, 
albeit not always successfully (for more 
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details see Mouloudi). This fits within a lon-
ger history of substantial growth of asso-
ciational life in Morocco, more particularly 
in cities, and especially since the 1990s 
when the Monarchy allowed more politi-
cal scope for maneuvering and tried to 
reconfigure its relations with a growing 
urban middle class (Abouhani). 
Also in Sidi Hmida (integrated in phase 
five), a neighborhood that experienced an 
influx of urban middle-class and even 
upper-class residents in recent decades 
(Amarouche), inhabitants have organized 
to influence the direction of the project. At 
first sight, social class status and personal 
networks seem to make a difference here, 
unlike with the inhabitants of Oulja.11 When 
people in Sidi Hmida heard about possi-
ble scenarios for their zone, some of them, 
mainly those with a middle class back-
ground, founded an association. One of 
the members of the association, who used 
to work for the Ministry of Agriculture and 
now owns two tree nurseries, stated that 
they actually managed to convince the 
Bouregreg Agency to redraft a new mas-
ter plan for their specific zone. “It was 
thanks to this association, which was 
founded mainly by public executives, phy-
sicians, and army colonels, that we man-
aged to put pressure on the agency to 
change her plans”.12 Moreover, although 
his personal situation was in many ways 
similar to some of the people we met in 
Oulja (he could not sell his property and 
the agency could still always expropriate 
him), he seemed much less pessimistic 
about the future. 
It’s true we are governed by the agen-
cy, the municipality has no business 
here. But that doesn’t bother me. The 
agency is better organized. It’s easier 
to talk to them than with a bureaucra-
tic state apparatus (…). The agency 
consists of serious people. Much more 
competent than those at the munici-
pality.13
Time, space and the broader political sig-
nificance of urban planning in Morocco
Urban planning can serve as an interesting 
lens to understand changing relations 
between citizens and political authority, 
including by producing different tempo-
ralities. A mega-project such as the 
Bouregreg project produces a particular 
temporality influenced by schedules, 
plans, market demand, delays, etc. and by 
expectations of (future) profit and value. 
But due to the particular legal situation 
created by Law 16-04 and the specific 
characteristics of ad hoc urbanism, the 
project enforces a quite different experi-
ence of time upon the actual inhabitants 
of the valley, who are, to be clear, not con-
sidered part of the project. Their time 
experience is reduced to a condition of 
waiting (for the advancement or delay of 
the project), often with limited possibilities 
for a way out. If the whole purpose of the 
Bouregreg project is to create a form of 
“progress” – based on promises of eco-
nomic growth, better infrastructure, envi-
ronmental protection, and even the pro-
tection of historical heritage – the 
particular situation in which the inhabit-
ants of the valley are kept actually pre-
cludes their very efforts to make progress 
in life.
This is closely related to a broader political 
significance. The changing nature of con-
temporary Moroccan politics is hidden 
within the relational complexes of power 
that produce urban mega-projects such as 
the Bouregreg project. In the process, the 
city itself is turned into a privileged vehicle 
for capital accumulation and speculation, 
while at the same time, decision-making 
processes are breaking loose from more 
conventional political entities. The process 
of agencification in Morocco entails that 
decisions about the future city, and hence, 
also about the future of millions of urban 
citizens, have been increasingly concen-
trated in exceptional governmental zones 
like the Bouregreg Valley and entrusted to 
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new state agencies that share power with 
and are made accountable to global cap-
ital, resulting in decisions made elsewhere, 
outside the scope and boundaries of the 
national state or the regime. 
The Bouregreg Agency, as a new state 
space, involves a deeply political move to 
dispossess both public and private land 
and bring the Valley into the global circu-
lation of capital in a way private investors 
could never do on their own. Massive pub-
lic funds are mobilized for infrastructural 
improvements (the bridge, the tunnel, the 
tramway, etc.) and for the creation of new 
landmarks (the Grand Theatre), most likely 
to improve primarily the attractiveness 
and profitability of urban land and real 
estate projects.
Yet, will these efforts also benefit the 
majority of citizens in Rabat, Salé, and their 
outskirts? The truth is that the Bouregreg 
mega-project is not just a wasteland being 
renovated, developed, and/or preserved, 
as it is often presented in official commu-
nication. It represents the creation of a 
globalized space, one that opens up and 
reaches out to the rest of the world, i.e., to 
foreign investors, tourists, and cosmopoli-
tan consumers, while at the same time 
drawing new social, economic, political, 
and spatial boundaries between those 
who can afford it and those who cannot.   
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9 The caid and the mqaddem 
are representatives of the 
Ministry of the Interior 
on the city and local 
neighborhood level. They 
are part of a parallel power 
structure in Morocco, 
loyal to the Monarchy that 
exists alongside elected 
government bodies. 
10 Field notes, July 2018.    
11 This is our hypothesis based 
on preliminary fieldwork. 
More empirical work needs 
to be done. 
12 Personal Interview, July 
2018.
13 Personal Interview, July 
2018.
Notes
1 The multinational fund 
consists of Moroccan capital 
and money from several Gulf 
countries.
2 Personal Interview, 
September 2013.
3 One Euro corresponds 
to approximately 10 to 11 
Moroccan dirhams, Personal 
Interview, April 2018. 
4 Personal Interview, April 
2018.
5 Personal Interview, July 
2018.
6 Field notes, July 2018.
7 Habous is an Islamic legal 
institution of religious 
mortmain property. The 
property is administered 
by the Ministry of Habous. 
Usufruct can be granted to 
farmers, for example, often in 
return for a form of rent. 
8 Field notes, July 2018.
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